Feminist Aims and A Trans-Inclusive Definition of  Woman by Kirkland, Katie L
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy
5-2-2018
Feminist Aims and A Trans-Inclusive Definition of
"Woman"
Katie L. Kirkland
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kirkland, Katie L., "Feminist Aims and A Trans-Inclusive Definition of "Woman"." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2018.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/225
  
FEMINIST AIMS AND A TRANS-INCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF “WOMAN” 
 
by 
 
KATIE KIRKLAND 
 
Under the Direction of Christie Hartley, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
Katharine Jenkins argues that Sally Haslanger’s focal analysis of gender problematically 
excludes non-passing trans women from the category “woman.” However, Jenkins does not 
explain why this exclusion contradicts the feminist aims of Haslanger’s account. In this paper, I 
advance two arguments that suggest that a trans-inclusive account of “woman” is crucial to the 
aims of feminism. I claim that the aims of feminism are to understand and combat women’s 
oppression. First, I argue that denial of trans identities reinforces cultural ideas that perpetuate 
both transphobic violence and sexual violence against women. Consequently, a feminist account 
of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities indirectly contributes to the oppression of 
women. Second, I prove that non-passing trans women are oppressed as women through the 
internalization of sexual objectification. I then conclude that an account of “woman” that 
excludes non-passing trans women cannot successfully advance a complete understanding of 
women’s oppression.  
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1 Introduction 
  In “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?” Sally 
Haslanger conducts a focal analysis of gender that is guided by the aims of critical feminist 
discourse. Haslanger defines being a “woman” as being a member of a social class whose 
unifying feature is social subordination based on one’s presumed or perceived female biological 
role in reproduction. Because feminist discourse aims to develop an understanding of the 
oppression of women, Haslanger does not think it problematic that her account excludes females 
who are not socially subordinated.   
 However, in “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman,” 
Katharine Jenkins argues that Haslanger’s focal analysis of gender problematically excludes non-
passing trans women from the category “woman.”1 Jenkins asserts that this exclusion of some 
trans women from her account of “woman” is incompatible with the feminist aims guiding 
Haslanger’s analytical inquiry. Jenkins claims that such exclusion marginalizes trans women 
within feminist discourse, but she does not offer a satisfying account of why such 
marginalization is problematic given the stated feminist aims of Haslanger’s account. In other 
words, Jenkins does not satisfyingly rule out the possibility that Haslanger’s exclusion of some 
trans women is defensible on the grounds that such trans women are not socially subordinated on 
the basis of their presumed biological role in reproduction. 
 I will argue that creating a trans-inclusive definition of woman is crucial to feminist aims. 
I start from the claim that the aims of feminism are to understand and combat women’s 
oppression. I then advance two arguments for the inclusion of trans women (both passing and 
non-passing) in a feminist account of “woman.” First, I argue that the political aim of 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, I use the phrase “non-passing trans women” to refer to those trans women who do not 
“pass” as cis women. In contrast, the phrase “passing trans women” refers to trans women who do “pass” as cis 
women. I will elaborate more on the phenomenon of passing in section II. 
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feminism—the commitment to combatting the oppression of women—requires that a feminist 
account of “woman” be trans-inclusive. I argue that feminism’s commitment to eradicating 
women’s oppression is embedded within a broader commitment to bring about a more just 
society. Using a definition of “woman” that marginalizes trans women is counterproductive to 
this aim of feminism. In addition, I argue that denial of trans identities reinforces cultural 
assumptions about the communicative nature of gender presentation. Insofar as these cultural 
assumptions motivate and are used to justify transphobic violence and sexual violence against 
women, an account of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities may perpetuate these 
oppressive forms of violence.  
Second, focusing specifically on the sexual objectification of women by cultural 
stereotypes that results in women’s internalization of this objectification through adaptive 
preferences, I argue that female gender identity is sufficient for trans women (passing and non-
passing) to experience the psychological forms of oppression that women face. Therefore, 
because all trans women can be oppressed as women, a feminist account of “woman” that 
excludes some trans women cannot fully serve the goal of feminist discourse—that is, advancing 
an understanding of women’s oppression.  
2 Background: Summary of Haslanger and Jenkins 
Haslanger conducts a focal analysis of gender in order to create a definition that serves 
the aims of critical feminist theory and avoids the commonality and normativity problems that 
often obstruct attempts to define “woman.”2 The commonality problem refers to the worry that 
there is no social feature or experience that all women share. The normativity problem involves 
                                                 
2 According to Haslanger, a focal analysis “explain[s] a variety of connected phenomena in terms of their relations 
to one that is theorized as the central or core phenomenon” (228). Haslanger takes gender’s function as a social class 
as the “core phenomenon” to be explained. All other aspects of gender—“norms, symbols, and identities”—are to be 
understood through the lens of gender as a social class. Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? 
(What) Do We Want Them To Be?” in Resisting Reality (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012): 228. 
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the recognition that any definition of woman has normative implications and may privilege some 
women and marginalize others or may even further entrench patriarchal values of femininity.3  
In order to generate a definition of “woman” that is guided by the interests of feminist 
analysis and avoids the commonality and normativity problems, Haslanger creates an account of 
“woman” in which being a woman involves being a member of a social class in which one is 
systematically subordinated on the basis of (presumed) biological sex:  
 S is a woman iff 
(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain bodily 
features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction; 
(ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S’s society as 
someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position that are in fact 
subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S’s occupying such a position); and 
(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S’s systematic subordination, that 
is, along some dimension, S’s social position is oppressive, and S’s satisfying (i) 
and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of subordination.4 
 
Haslanger claims that her focal account of woman avoids the commonality and normativity 
problems because it is an analytical account that focuses on subordinate social positions as the 
feature that women share.5 Further, while Haslanger admits that some non-oppressed females 
may not count as women on her account, she claims that this is not problematic insofar as the 
account is intended to facilitate critical feminist analysis: “The important issue is not whether a 
particular account ‘marginalizes’ some individuals, but whether its doing so is in conflict with 
the feminist values that motivate the inquiry.”6  
Before offering an account of why this marginalization is problematic, a few comments 
about “passing” might be helpful. A trans woman “passes” when she is perceived to be a woman 
                                                 
3 Haslanger, 228. 
4 Haslanger, 234. Emphasis in the original. 
5 Haslanger, 240. 
6 Ibid. When Haslanger claims that some non-oppressed females may not be counted as women, she means women 
who are privileged socially, politically, and economically such that they cannot be considered members of a 
subordinated social class. Later, in the PEA Soup discussion of Jenkins’ paper, Haslanger acknowledges that her 
account fails to capture all the individuals that feminism ought to be concerned about (i.e. trans women).  
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by those around her. Specifically, the term “passing” applies to contexts in which others observe 
or imagine a trans woman to have “bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s 
biological role in reproduction.”7 Following the spirit of Haslanger’s definition, I will call 
“passing” those trans women who are perceived to be women “regularly and for the most part” 
and “non-passing” those trans women who are not perceived to be women “regularly and for the 
most part.”  
Jenkins argues that Haslanger’s account of “woman” problematically excludes some trans 
women from the category of woman. Specifically, Haslanger’s account excludes trans women 
who are non-passing. Jenkins details four scenarios in which a trans woman may find herself: (1) 
a trans woman who does not publicly present as a woman and is perceived and treated as a man 
by those around her; (2) a trans woman who presents as a woman but who is perceived and 
treated as a man (or, further, a man pretending to be a woman); (3) a trans woman who presents 
as a woman and is treated as a woman because she is thought to be biologically female (i.e. she 
is “passing”); (4) a trans woman who presents as a woman and is treated as a woman, not 
because she is perceived to be biologically female but rather because those around her 
unconditionally respect individuals’ gender presentation.8 On Haslanger’s account, only trans 
women in scenario 3 would count as women. The trans woman who finds herself in Jenkins’s 
scenarios 1 and 2 is not passing at that time and consequently is not functioning as a woman. 
Jenkins explicitly states, but does not explain or defend, that the exclusion of some trans 
women from Haslanger’s account is problematic, given the feminist aims of her inquiry:  
Failure to respect the gender identifications of trans people is a serious harm and is 
conceptually linked to forms of transphobic oppression and even violence. It follows 
from this that an important desideratum of a feminist analysis of gender concepts is that it 
                                                 
7 Haslanger, 234-35.  
8 Katharine Jenkins, “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman,” Ethics 126 (2016): 
399-401. 
5 
 
respect these identifications by including trans people within the gender categories with 
which they identify and not including them within any categories with which they do not 
identify.9 
 
After demonstrating this alleged flaw in Haslanger’s account, Jenkins tries to repair the account 
by adding gender identity as a twin target concept with Haslanger’s gender as social class.10 
Although I agree with Jenkins’ claim, she fails to show why the harms and oppressions that trans 
people face necessitate that a feminist analysis of gender ought to be trans-inclusive.  
In light of Haslanger’s account, it seems that non-passing trans women are not socially 
subordinated as women “regularly and for the most part” because they are not perceived to be 
women “regularly and for the most part.” Because the aim of Haslanger’s account is to develop a 
definition of “woman” that allows feminist analysis to treat women as a group because of their 
shared experience of oppression, it is important that anyone who is counted as a woman under 
her account is oppressed as a woman. Thus, in order for Jenkins’ revision of Haslanger’s account 
to be faithful to the original aims of the account, it must be the case that sexist subordination is a 
systematic and pervasive element of the experience of non-passing trans women.  
 For the purposes of this paper, I will follow Haslanger and Jenkins and define the aims of 
feminism broadly. On my view, the aims of feminism are to understand and combat women’s 
oppression.11 It is based on this description of feminism’s goals that I will defend the claim that 
developing an account of gender that respects trans identities is critical to the goals of feminism.  
                                                 
9 Jenkins, 396. It should be noted that, while Jenkins’ revision of Haslanger’s account solves the first problem that is 
mentioned here (i.e. excluding some trans women from the category “woman”) it does not solve the second problem 
of wrongful inclusion (i.e. including some trans women in the category “man”).  
10 Jenkins, 406-413. Recall that Haslanger’s “focal analysis” takes gender’s function as a social class to be the “core 
phenomenon” through which all other aspects of gender ought to be understood. In advocating a “twin target 
concept,” Jenkins hopes to elevate gender as identity to have equal status with gender as social class, such that non-
passing trans women are not classified as women only in a secondary sense.  
11 Haslanger claims that her focal analysis is guided by “The need to identify and explain persistent inequalities 
between females and males,” which indicates an emphasis on the importance of understanding and explaining 
women’s oppression (226; emphasis added). Similarly in “On Being Objective and Being Objectified,” Haslanger 
claims: “If feminism is successful, there will no longer be a gender distinction as such—or, allowing that there are a 
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3 Feminist Politics: Combatting Women’s Oppression 
 In this section, I argue that a definition of “woman” that excludes (some) trans women is 
incompatible with the first aim of feminism—that is, combatting women’s oppression. In the 
first subsection, I argue that feminism’s commitment to eradicating women’s oppression entails 
an implicit commitment to avoid perpetuating or contributing to the oppression of others. I then 
argue that failure to respect trans identities is itself unjust and, further, that it perpetuates the 
oppression of trans individuals. Consequently, a definition of “woman” that fails to respect trans 
identities is in tension with feminism’s implicit commitment to avoid perpetuating oppression.  
 In the second subsection, I argue that failing to respect trans identities contributes to the 
oppression of women. Specifically, I argue that transphobic violence and sexual violence against 
women are both motivated and justified by cultural assumptions about the communicative 
relationship between gender presentation and sexual availability. I then argue that failing to 
respect trans identities reinforces this cultural assumption and, in turn, perpetuates the oppression 
of women. Consequently, a definition of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities is 
incompatible with feminism’s commitment to eradicating women’s oppression.   
3.1 A Commitment to Eradicating Societal Injustice  
Although feminists have diverse views, all feminists hold that women are oppressed, that 
oppression is unjust, and that women’s oppression must be ended. Given that feminists recognize 
oppression as unjust and, hence, a serious moral wrong, they ought to avoid perpetuating or 
contributing to the oppression of others in their attempts to end the oppression of women. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
plurality of relations that serve to constitute gender and a plurality of feminist projects, we can say that one goal of 
feminism is to fight against the sexual subordination that constitutes these categories of men and women” (62). 
Jenkins expresses a commitment to feminism’s political goal of ending women’s oppression in addition to echoing 
the idea that it is first necessary to understand this oppression. This reasoning is revealed in Jenkins’ discussion of 
how her modification of Haslanger’s account improves its explanatory power: “both gender as class and gender as 
identity are relevant to understanding the oppression of women” (414). 
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does not mean, however, that feminists ought to be committed to eradicating all forms of 
oppression simultaneously. Rather, given their broader condemnation of oppression as a serious 
moral wrong, feminists are implicitly committed to the idea that society would be improved if 
there were fewer instances of oppression and injustice. That is, let us say that feminists view (or 
ought to view) a more just society as their end. If they are (implicitly) committed to this claim, 
then feminists ought not perpetuate injustice or oppression of any kind (whether directly or 
indirectly). Such perpetuation of oppression and/or injustice would be morally indefensible for 
the feminist who holds that oppression is a serious moral wrong. More importantly, however, 
such perpetuation of oppression is in conflict with feminism’s implicit commitment to bringing 
about a more just society. In other words, such perpetuation of oppression and/or injustice is 
antifeminist. 
In what follows, I will demonstrate that failure to respect trans identities perpetuates 
transphobic oppression both directly and indirectly. That is, failure to respect trans identities is 
itself an injustice and it motivates further injustices committed against trans people. Therefore, a 
feminist account of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities perpetuates transphobic 
oppression. Given that feminists ought to be committed to avoiding the perpetuation of 
oppression and injustice, such failure to respect trans identities is in tension with feminists’ 
commitment to the eradication of women’s oppression.12  
 According to Bettcher in “Trans Identities and First-Person Authority,” denial of trans 
identities is a violation of ethical first person authority and is therefore unjust. Bettcher begins by 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that the reason that I argue for inclusion of trans women in a feminist account of “woman” is 
because lack of recognition as women contributes to the oppression of trans women and is therefore in tension with 
feminist aims. Such a strategy would not apply to, say, black men, whose oppression is not intensified by their 
exclusion from the category “woman.” While feminists’ commitment to ending oppression requires that feminists 
avoid perpetuating the oppression of black men, excluding black men from the category “woman” does not 
contribute to their oppression. Therefore, there is no imperative to include black men in a feminist account of 
“woman.”  
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proposing an ethical notion of first person authority that is meant to extend beyond the epistemic 
notion. According to Bettcher, we have ethical first person authority (hereafter, FPA) over our 
mental attitudes. We can be held responsible for our attitudes in the sense that we “can be faulted 
for holding inappropriate, false, or irrational attitudes.”13 In other words, disclosure of our 
attitudes can have social consequences. Because of this culpability for our mental attitudes, 
Bettcher claims that the ethical notion of FPA entails that individuals have a right to privacy and 
ownership of their attitudes.14 Consequently, disclosure of one’s attitudes ought not be coerced, 
nor should a person “avow somebody else’s mental attitudes on their own behalf.”15  
Bettcher claims “existential self-identity” falls under ethical FPA and that gender is part 
of one’s existential self-identity.16 Bettcher claims that existential self-identity is not a 
conception of the self but is instead determined by the set of beliefs, attitudes, and commitments 
that one has. Because existential self-identity concerns one’s beliefs, attitudes, and commitments, 
it “falls under the reach of FPA.” 17 On Bettcher’s account, gender is properly part of one’s 
existential self-identity and therefore ought to be protected by ethical FPA. Bettcher provides 
three reasons why gender is properly understood as part of one’s existential self-identity. First, 
within trans-friendly communities, one’s gender self-identification does not invalidate others’, 
                                                 
13 Talia Mae Bettcher, “Trans Identities and First-Person Authority,” in “You’ve Changed”: Sex Reassignment and 
Personal Identity, Laurie Shrage, ed. Oxford: Oxford UP (2009): 102. 
14 One might object that we can be responsible for something without having a right to privacy with regard to that 
thing. For example, one may be responsible for their testimony in court without having a right to privacy with regard 
to what one witnessed. However, with attitudes and beliefs that are not acted upon and therefore do not directly 
impact other people, it seems that the right to privacy might still apply. FPA’s right to privacy regarding attitudes 
and beliefs is more akin to the right to privacy regarding which candidate we vote for.  
15 Ibid., 102. 
16 Bettcher explains the concept of existential self-identity by contrasting it with metaphysical self-identity. 
According to Bettcher, metaphysical self-identity is “a self-conception that answers the question ‘What am I?’ It 
involves an overall picture of the world (including categories such as men and women) in which one locates 
oneself” (110). In contrast, existential self-identity answers the questions “What am I about? What moves me? What 
do I stand for? What do I care about the most?” (110). 
17 Ibid., 110.  
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even if they hold different and/or conflicting metaphysical views about gender and sex.18 If 
gender was understood as constituting part of one’s metaphysical self-identity, some individuals’ 
gender self-identifications would inevitably invalidate others’ if they held conflicting 
metaphysical views about gender and sex.  Second, when one self-identifies as a particular 
gender, one is not making a claim about metaphysical reality but rather about one’s beliefs.19 
Bettcher illuminates this point with an example: “For example, if one believes some neurological 
state makes one a woman and it turns out one lacks this state, it follows one is not a women. 
However, it is generally assumed in community interactions that the truth or falsity of a person’s 
self-identifying claim does not stand or fall on such issues.”20 Third, existential self-identity 
helps us understand individuals’ motivations for self-identifying in a certain way, whereas 
metaphysical self-identity does not.21  
 Because gender is part of an individual’s existential self-identity and existential self-
identity falls under ethical FPA, it follows that individuals have FPA over their gender self-
identifications. Recall that, according to Bettcher, under the ethical notion of FPA individuals 
have a right to privacy and ownership of their mental attitudes. This privacy and ownership 
entails that it is morally impermissible to coerce someone into revealing one’s attitudes and it is 
also morally impermissible to make avowals about another’s attitudes on their behalf. When 
applied to gender, FPA entails that one cannot be forced to reveal one’s gender to others nor can 
a person assume the authority of determining the truth of another’s gender identity. According to 
Bettcher, failing to respect trans identities is a case of the latter violation of FPA.  
                                                 
18 Ibid., 111. 
19 Ibid., 111. 
20 Ibid., 111. 
21 Ibid., 111.  
10 
 
 According to Bettcher, the “natural attitude” regarding conceptions of sex and gender 
holds that “there are two naturally mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and invariant sexes, and 
membership within a sex is determined by genitalia.”22 Bettcher claims that “normals” (those 
who hold the natural attitude) do not respect trans self-identifications because they think that 
“real” gender is inevitably determined by genitalia. In such cases, “normals” violate trans 
people’s FPA over gender because they take their own metaphysical conception of sex as 
determinative of the trans person’s “authentic” gender. In other words, such denials of trans 
identities is a case of one person making definitive and authoritative claims about another 
person’s mental attitudes on their behalf, which is a morally impermissible violation of FPA. But 
denial of trans identities is more serious than a simple case of a controlling person asserting 
authority over another’s mental attitudes. In contrast, when a trans person’s identity is denied, 
the trans person is not given any opportunity to make a genuine avowal. That is, no matter what 
the trans person claims regarding his or her gender, the denier has already determined the trans 
person’s “real” gender based on her assessment of the trans person’s “natural” genital status. In 
other words, if a trans woman claims “I am a woman,” this is interpreted as a lie or as pretense. 
When trans identities are denied, it “silences a transperson’s avowal of existential self-
identity.”23 
Failure to respect trans identities contributes to trans oppression by motivating sexual 
violence and physical violence as well as by legitimating victim blaming in cases of transphobic 
violence. In addition the risk of violence, when coupled with common assumptions about the 
illegitimacy of trans identities, creates double binds for trans people. Bettcher argues that one 
form of trans oppression is what she terms “reality enforcement,” which is motivated by 
                                                 
22 Bettcher, “Trans Identities,” 103.  
23 Bettcher, “Trans Identities,” 115.  
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assumptions about the illegitimacy of trans identities.24 According to Bettcher, reality 
enforcement has four essential features. First, identity invalidation occurs when a trans person’s 
gender identity is “erased”—that is, when an individual categorizes a trans woman as a man (for 
example). Second, according to Bettcher, identity invalidation is asserted in terms of an 
appearance-reality contrast—for example, the onlooker will say something like “that’s really a 
man disguised as a woman.” Third, knowledge of this appearance-reality contrast presents trans 
people with a double bind. That is, they can either pass as cis and risk being exposed as a 
deceiver or they can be openly trans and be treated as a pretender. Finally, reality enforcement 
involves some form of genital verification either through physical exposure or through comments 
that assert the “reality” of a trans person’s genital status.25 
Although Bettcher does not explicitly defend her claim that reality enforcement is a form 
of trans oppression, her discussion of the phenomenon includes the necessary features for reality 
enforcement to constitute a form of oppression. Here I will draw on Bettcher’s comments to 
assert that reality enforcement is oppressive because it involves or threatens to involve sexual 
violence, physical violence, victim blaming, and double binds.  
First, reality enforcement can paradigmatically involve sexual violence. There are two 
main ways that sexual violence is often involved in reality enforcement. First, trans people are 
often raped as a result of the discovery that they are trans. Bettcher interprets rape of FTMs “as 
an obvious strategy for putting ‘women back in their rightful place.’”26 Similarly, MTFs are 
often subject to sexual violence in the form of rape. Second, as Bettcher notes, genital 
verification is one of the essential features of identity enforcement. Genital verification can occur 
                                                 
24 Bettcher, “Trapped,” 392, 403. In “Evil Deceivers” Bettcher refers to the same phenomenon as “identity 
enforcement” (47).  
25 Bettcher, “Trapped,” 392.  
26 Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers,” 57. 
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either through forced physical exposure or through non-euphemistic statements about the genital 
status of the victim. When genital verification takes the form of forced physical exposure, this is 
a form of sexual violence.  
Second, reality enforcement often involves physical violence against trans people. 
Transphobic violence can be motivated by either the deceiver stereotype or the pretender 
stereotype. For those who are openly trans and are thus interpreted as “an x pretending to be a y,” 
they may be subjected to violence because they are interpreted as violating gender norms: “If a 
person is subjected to discrimination or violence because this person is taken to be in violation of 
gender norms (perhaps because the person is wearing a dress), this is no doubt because the 
person is being transphobically viewed as a man.”27 In contrast, trans people who attempt to pass 
as cis are often viewed as malicious deceivers upon discovery and are often subjected to brutal 
violence as a form of retaliation for the deception.  
Third, in cases of transphobic violence, the acts of the perpetrator are often justified or 
minimized by use of victim blaming. Specifically, the trans panic defense has been used in court 
as a defense against hate crime charges for individuals who murdered trans people.28 The trans 
panic defense often appeals to the sexual deception that the trans victim engaged in and, 
according to Bettcher, this sexual deception is often equated with rape.29 Consequently, the 
violence and consequent murder of the trans “deceiver” is interpreted as a violent and enraged 
response to the shock of discovering that the perpetrator has been deceived by the trans victim.  
Finally, as I mentioned above, one of the essential features of reality enforcement is the 
double bind that trans people face. That is, trans people face the deceiver-pretender double bind 
in which they must choose between having their gender identity taken seriously and minimizing 
                                                 
27 Bettcher, “Trapped,” 396. 
28 Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers,” 42-45. 
29 Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers,” 52-54. 
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the risk of lethal violence. This double bind is characteristically oppressive insofar as it limits 
trans people’s options to two unsavory choices.30  
All of these paradigmatic features of reality enforcement are motivated by a belief that 
trans identities are illegitimate. Consequently, failure to respect trans identities contributes to 
trans oppression in the forms of double binds, sexual violence, physical violence, and victim 
blaming. Thus, failure to respect trans identities is in tension with feminists’ implicit 
commitment to avoid perpetuating oppression and is therefore anti-feminist.   
Insofar as feminism is necessarily embedded within a broader condemnation of 
oppression and injustice, it runs counter to the aims and commitments of feminists to perpetuate 
oppression, particularly oppression that is based on gender or gender identity. Failure to respect 
trans identities often underlies transphobic violence, which is a form of oppression.31 Thus, it 
seems that there is, in fact, a strong imperative for a feminist analysis of gender to respect the 
gender identities of trans people by developing a trans-inclusive definition of woman.  
3.2 Common Sources of Sexism and Transphobia 
As I claimed above, one of the aims of feminism is to eradicate the oppression of women. 
Here, I argue that failing to respect trans identities contributes to the oppression of women. 
Consequently, an account of “woman” that excludes (non-passing) trans women is in tension 
with this aim of feminism. Specifically, failure to respect trans identities supports a cultural 
assumption that motivates and is used to justify sexual violence against women. A feminist 
account of “woman” that excludes (non-passing) trans women fails to respect trans identities. 
                                                 
30 See: Marilyn Frye, “Oppression,” in The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, by Marilyn Frye, 
Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press (1983): 2-3. 
31 Systematic violence is one of the forms of oppression that Young discusses in her “Five Faces.” Iris Marion 
Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990): 
61-63. 
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Therefore, it is crucial to the aims of feminism that a feminist account of “woman” be trans-
inclusive.  
 According to Bettcher, gender presentation is taken to communicate genital status. I 
would like to suggest, further, that gender presentation more broadly communicates sexual 
availability. Specifically, female gender presentation is taken to communicate sexual availability 
for men—where sexual availability for men includes female genitalia and a heterosexual interest 
in sex with men. Bettcher argues that the communicative connection between gender 
presentation and genital status underlies the trans panic defense (which has been used to defend 
perpetrators of transphobic violence). She compares the denial of authenticity at work in the 
trans panic defense to the denial of authenticity that is employed in shifting blame to victims of 
sexual violence. Here, I want to suggest that the communicative connection between gender 
presentation and sexual availability both motivates and is used to justify sexual violence against 
women as well as transphobic violence.  
 When a woman adopts a feminine gender presentation, she is taken to be communicating 
her sexual availability—she is communicating female genital status but, more importantly, she is 
taken to be communicating an interest in sex with men. Marilyn Frye expresses this idea in the 
following:  
It is a sort of implicit theory of women’s sexuality according to which a woman who 
largely adheres to patriarchal feminine norms in act and attitude and who does not 
radically challenge or rebel against patriarchal institutions is heterosexual, and a woman 
who does not comply with feminine norms or who seriously challenges or rebels against 
patriarchal institutions is a lesbian.32 
 
When a woman refuses a man’s sexual advances, the assumption that her gender presentation is 
communicative can be invoked and used to undermine her verbal expression of disinterest. That 
                                                 
32 Marilyn Frye, “Willful Virgin or Do You Have to Be a Lesbian to Be a Feminist?,” in Willful Virgin: Essays in 
Feminism 1976-1992, by Marilyn Frye, Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press (1992): 127-28. 
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is, in some cases, gender presentation overrules a woman’s expressed disinterest in sex. In this 
way, the communicative connection between gender presentation and sexual availability 
motivates sexual violence against women by undermining the authority of women’s verbal 
refusals of sexual advances. Further, in cases where a woman has been a victim of sexual 
violence, blame is often shifted to the victim by alluding to the victim’s attire. Specifically, 
remarks are often made about the victim’s attire, suggesting that, by her gender presentation, 
“she was asking for it.” In this way, the communicative connection between gender presentation 
and sexual availability is used to justify sexual violence against women.  
 Similarly, Bettcher claims that much transphobic violence is motivated and justified by 
the idea that trans victims “deceive” their assailants by presenting a gender that does not align 
with the genital status that they were assigned at birth.33 That is, trans women in particular are 
often subjected to violence that is motivated by the assailant’s anger at discovering that the 
woman he was sexually interested in (or intimate with) is “really a man.” Underlying this 
violence is an assumption that trans identities are illegitimate or false. In this way, the 
communicative connection between gender presentation and sexual availability motivates 
transphobic violence. Additionally, the assumed illegitimacy of trans identities is used to defend 
perpetrators of transphobic violence. Again, blame is shifted to the victim because it is asserted 
that the victim has misrepresented her “true” identity by presenting as a woman when her genital 
status at birth is thought to make her “really a man.” In this way, the communicative connection 
between gender presentation and sexual availability is used to justify transphobic violence. 
 Insofar as the same cultural assumption about the communicative connection between 
gender presentation and sexual availability motivates and is used to justify both transphobic 
violence and sexual violence against women, anything that supports this cultural assumption also 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 56. 
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contributes to transphobic violence and sexual violence against women. Failure to respect trans 
identities supports this cultural assumption and therefore contributes to the oppressive forms of 
violence against trans people and women. Failure to respect trans identities supports the notion 
that trans people are deceivers because of the misalignment of their gender presentation and their 
genitalia. In other words, failing to respect trans identities supports the identification of trans 
people as deceivers because of their violation of the communicative connection between gender 
presentation and sexual availability (specifically genital status). Because failure to respect trans 
identities supports the communicative connection between gender presentation and genital status, 
it contributes to transphobic violence and sexual violence against women. Insofar as sexual 
violence against women (and women’s resultant fear of being subjected to such violence) is a 
feature of women’s oppression, failure to respect trans identities contributes to the oppression of 
women. Therefore, failure to respect trans identities conflicts with the feminist aim of eradicating 
women’s oppression. Consequently, a feminist account of “woman” that fails to respect trans 
identities by excluding (non-passing) trans women undermines the feminist commitment 
combatting women’s oppression.  
4 Feminist Discourse: Understanding Women’s Oppression 
 As stated above, feminist discourse is intended to advance our understanding of the 
oppression that is faced by women as women. As Haslanger claims (and Jenkins seems to agree), 
successful feminist discourse requires the use of a definition of “woman” that allows us to focus 
our analysis on those individuals who are oppressed by sexual subordination: “For the purposes 
of critical feminist inquiry, oppression is a significant fact around which we should organize our 
theoretical categories; it may be that non-oppressed females are marginalized within my account, 
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but that is because for the broader purposes at hand… they are not the ones that matter.”34 If it is 
the case that non-passing trans women are oppressed as women, then an account of “woman” 
that excludes them cannot successfully fulfill the purpose of feminist discourse 
In what follows, I will demonstrate that non-passing trans women are oppressed as 
women and, consequently, a definition of “woman” that is intended to serve the aims of feminist 
discourse must include trans women. Because non-passing trans women are not perceived to be 
women “regularly and for the most part,” I cannot rely on external sources of oppression to 
prove that they are oppressed as women. In what follows, I will argue that non-passing trans 
women are oppressed as women because they are sexually objectified as women in some senses. 
First, I will suggest that, as women, trans women (both passing and non-passing) are subject to 
indirect sexual objectification at the hands of cultural stereotypes that sexualize women, their 
bodies, their appearances, and their actions. Then, I will draw on Sandra Bartky’s suggestion that 
women can and do objectify themselves to argue that, like all other women, non-passing trans 
women can be oppressed by their internalization of oppressive gender norms.  
4.1 Accounts of Sexual Objectification 
Objectification typically involves a failure to recognize the objectified individual as a 
person and moral equal. That is, the victim of objectification is not recognized as an autonomous 
individual with interests and desires of her own.35 Further, sexual objectification involves 
viewing the objectified individual as an instrument for one’s own sexual pleasure, as Bartky 
explains: “A person is sexually objectified when her sexual parts or sexual functions are 
                                                 
34 Haslanger, 240. 
35 Ann E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, Oxford: Oxford UP (2006): 165; Carol Hay, “Whether to Ignore Them and 
Spin: Moral Obligations to Resist Sexual Harassment,” Hypatia 20, no. 4 (2005): 96.  
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separated out from the rest of her personality and reduced to the status of mere instruments or 
else regarded as if they were capable of representing her.”36  
 Both Bartky and Cudd identify sexual objectification as a form of psychological 
oppression. According to Bartky, psychological oppression necessarily involves a failure to 
recognize the full personhood of the oppressed.37 Pervasive sexual objectification meets the 
criteria for psychological oppression because it involves viewing members of certain groups as 
less than full persons and, when victims of objectification internalize these views, objectification 
in fact prevents its victims from exercising their full personhood.  
 Bartky rejects the notion that sexual harassment based on sexual objectification is merely 
an expression of attraction or eroticism. Instead, Bartky suggests that sexual objectification 
involves the employment of ideas and stereotypes about women’s social subordination and the 
appropriateness of treating women as sexual objects:  
While it is true that for these men I am nothing but, let us say, a ‘nice piece of ass,’ there 
is more involved in this encounter than their mere fragmented perception of me. They 
could, after all, have enjoyed me in silence… But I must be made to know that I am a 
‘nice piece of ass’: I must be made to see myself as they see me… What I describe seems 
less the spontaneous expression of a healthy eroticism than a ritual of subjugation.38 
 
According to Bartky, sexual objectification plays an essential role in the social subordination of 
women not simply because it involves viewing a woman as a mere object but because the victim 
is often made aware of being viewed as a mere object.39 Sexual objectification of women is, 
however, far more complex than isolated instances of individual women being objectified by 
                                                 
36 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression, New York: 
Routledge (1990): 26.  
37 Bartky, 29-30. 
38 Bartky, 27. Emphasis in the original. 
39 Bartky, 27. In contrast to Bartky, Carol Hay distinguishes between sexual objectification and sexual harassment. 
On Hay’s account, sexual harassment is “the outward behavior that arises from sexual objectification” (96). 
According to Hay, sexual harassment is a group harm. In other words, women as a group are harmed by sexual 
harassment because it arises from and contributes to women’s diminished (sense of) autonomy as a result of 
oppression (97). 
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individual men. Cudd and Bartky both argue that women as a group are systematically 
objectified by the cultural emphasis on women’s appearance and the sexualization of women in 
popular media:  
Apart from directly objectifying actions, there is also a sense in which our culture 
constantly, tacitly sexually objectifies women so commonly as to constitute direct, 
cultural, psychological oppression. Women are sexually objectified in this indirect sense 
when as a gender they are taken to be the representatives of sex and sexual passivity, for 
example, when goods are marketed to them by displaying women as objects of 
adornment or sexual pleasure, or through beauty pageants and pompon squads.40 
 
Here Cudd illustrates the way that culture indirectly objectifies women by unquestioningly 
representing women as sex objects whose purpose is to satisfy the sexual desires of men.  
4.2 Sexually Objectifying Stereotypes 
 Women (both trans and cis) are objectified by sexually objectifying stereotypes that are 
dominant in our society. Such objectifying stereotypes play a significant role in the social 
subordination of women as a group. Even if non-passing trans women are not the victims of 
isolated, individual instances of sexual objectification (which seems unlikely), one can still argue 
that they are sexually objectified as women by attending to the ways that they are subject to 
cultural sources of indirect sexual objectification. 
 Bettcher describes the sexualized stereotypes that are often applied to trans women but 
not trans men: “it is not uncommon for mtfs to be viewed as sexually available and disposable 
whores—a stereotype simply not applied to ftms.”41 What Bettcher here refers to as a stereotype 
is not simply a stereotype but a sexually objectifying stereotype. The stereotype that trans women 
are “sexually available and disposable whores” meets both the criteria of sexual objectification 
                                                 
40 Cudd, 166-67. 
41 Talia Mae Bettcher,”Appearance, Reality, and Gender Deception,” in Violence, Victims, and Justifications, Felix 
Murchada, ed. New York: Peter Lang (2006): 179. MTF refers to trans women—those individuals assigned male at 
birth but who identify or present as women—and FTM refers to trans men—those individuals assigned female at 
birth but who identify or present as men.  
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mentioned above—it fails to recognize a group of persons as autonomous moral agents with their 
own wishes and desires and it treats the objectified individuals as instruments for (men’s) sexual 
pleasure. Further, because this stereotype applies to trans women but not trans men, it is clear 
that, while the stereotype is influenced by trans women’s intersecting identities, an element of 
the stereotype is unique to the oppression of women generally. Thus, the stereotype that Bettcher 
mentions demonstrates that trans women as a group are sexually objectified as women by 
cultural sources.   
Similarly, Julia Serano explains that trans women’s transitions are often sexualized 
through the common assumption that the transitions are motivated by a desire to attract men: 
“the assumption that we change our sex in order to attract men essentially sexualizes our motives 
for transitioning, a move that disempowers trans women and femaleness while reinforcing the 
idea that heterosexual male desire is central.”42 Serano connects this sexualization of trans 
women’s transitions to the rampant sexualization of women generally in our society: 
However, it’s a mistake for cissexual women to view depictions of trans women as 
having little to do with themselves, as they are so obviously meant to dismiss both 
transsexuality and femaleness. After all, in a world where women are regularly reduced 
to objects of male desire, it’s no accident that trans women—the only people in our 
society who actively choose to become women and who actively fight for their right to be 
recognized as female—are almost universally depicted in a purely sexualized manner.43 
 
Serano’s analysis of the connection between the sexualization of MTF transitions and the sexual 
objectification of women generates compelling support for the claim that trans women (passing 
and non-passing alike) are subject to indirect sexual objectification at the hands of cultural 
sources in much the same way as women generally.  
 
 
                                                 
42 Serano, 259. 
43 Serano, 262. Emphasis in the original. 
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4.3 Self-Objectification 
As a result of systematic objectification, some women internalize their objectification, 
such that they come to objectify themselves. Cudd discusses the way that women’s 
internalization of sexual objectification can lead women to want to satisfy men’s (sexual) desires 
without considering or at the expense of their own desires (sexual and otherwise): “The sexual 
objectification of women involves taking women to have a nature that suits them to be objects 
for the sexual pleasure of men, that is, to naturally desire to fulfill men’s wish that they become 
subordinate to men, to fulfill men’s desires rather than to seek to know and fulfill their own.”44 
Bartky focuses on a different aspect of women’s self-objectification—the reduction of women’s 
identities to their bodies and physical appearance: “Subject to the evaluating eye of the male 
connoisseur, women learn to evaluate themselves first and best. Our identities can no more be 
kept separate from the appearance of our bodies than they can be kept separate from the shadow-
selves of the female stereotype.”45 According to Bartky, external sources objectify women so 
pervasively that women themselves learn to objectify themselves by treating their physical 
appearance as an essential determinant of their identity and worth. 
I would like to suggest that, not only can trans women be susceptible to this form of 
oppressive self-objectification but also that many trans women are victims of self-objectification 
as women. Further, because this is an internalized form of oppression, it does not matter whether 
or not the individual woman in question is classed as a woman by the surrounding members of 
society. Rather, what matters in determining whether or not a particular woman is, in fact, 
included among those who are harmed or potentially harmed by such self-objectification is 
whether or not she takes herself to be the type of individual to whom the cultural expectations 
                                                 
44 Cudd, 166. 
45 Bartky, 28. 
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and stereotypes apply. In other words, what matters is whether or not the individual in question 
identifies as a woman.46 
Subject to the same societal identifications of women with their sexualized bodies, trans 
women who want to present as women face the difficult double bind of wanting to present and 
be recognized as the gender that they identify with in a society that intensely associates female 
gender presentation with social subordination and sexual objectification. In other words, in 
presenting as women, trans women adopt the norms of attire and behavior that commonly reduce 
women to their bodies and sexual function. Serano suggests that the process by which trans 
women come to internalize these norms is not unlike that of cis women:  
despite being socialized male, those of us on the MTF spectrum have been exposed to 
many of the same explicitly sexualizing cultural messages about womanhood and 
femininity as those socialized female, and we are just as susceptible of constructing our 
own sexualities and self-images around those very same cultural ideals.47  
 
Specifically, the ideal image of female beauty is a slim, hairless, young woman who has large 
(but not too large) “assets.” This image contains within it several different norms that might 
govern a woman’s behavior in attempts to conform to the ideal: hairlessness, youth, and physical 
fitness.  
 Not only are women not supposed to have facial hair, but the norms of feminine beauty 
require the removal of body hair from the legs, armpits and pubis.48 Adherence to this norm 
                                                 
46 The point here is that anyone (including non-passing trans women) who has a female gender identity can said to 
be oppressed as a women. In this section, I am drawing on Jenkins’ notion of gender identity. Specifically, for 
Jenkins, someone has a female gender identity if they have “an internal ‘map’ that is formed to guide someone who 
is subordinated on the basis of having actual or imagined bodily features that are presumed to be evidence of a 
female’s role in biological reproduction through the social or material realities characteristic of a person who is so 
subordinated” (410). Consequently, here I am arguing that anyone who has the “internal map” of a woman is 
susceptible to self-objectification and therefore can be oppressed as a woman.  
47 Serano, 270. 
48 According to a study done by Rowen et al. that investigated the prevalence of and motivations for pubic hair 
grooming among women in the United States, 83.8% (2778) of women surveyed reported that they had been 
grooming regularly for most of their adult lives. Further, the most commonly cited situation for which women 
groom was sex. Specifically, 55.6% (1544) of women surveyed claimed that they often groom for sexual situations. 
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requires extensive, regular (sometimes painful and expensive) hair removal. Women’s armpits, 
legs, and pubis ought to be shaven, waxed, or sometimes even treated with laser hair removal. 
But some women take this norm even further, removing hair from their chests, arms, stomachs, 
feet, backs, and hands. Not only is this particular norm costly in terms of time, effort, money, 
and pain, but it is also somewhat unachievable in that it requires women’s bodies to exhibit a 
characteristic that is unnatural for adult women. In other words, this norm requires women to 
constantly wage war against the natural process of hair growth, such that attempts to adhere to 
this norm are never-ending.  
 A similarly unnatural norm contained within the image of female beauty is the emphasis 
on youth. It seems that the ideally beautiful woman ought to appear to be in her twenties long 
after that is physically possible. In order to achieve such results, women are advised by fashion 
and beauty magazines to begin anti-aging regimens as early as their late twenties. Women are 
sold countless creams, serums, and masks designed to fight the aging of their skin. Women are 
expected to dye gray hairs. And, if one is desperate, brave, and/or wealthy enough, women can 
undergo any of a number of expensive and painful procedures designed to give the appearance of 
youth—including, but not limited to, face lifts, botox injections, and laser treatments.49  
 Further, the ideally beautiful woman also has a physique that is practically impossible to 
achieve, both because it is internally contradictory and because it requires extreme dedication to 
dieting and exercise, as Clare Chambers expresses quite clearly and succinctly: “most women 
could never be as thin or as flat-stomached as the models they try to emulate… breasts that are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tami S. Rowen et al. “Pubic Hair Grooming Prevalence and Mtivation Among Women in the United States,” JAMA 
Dermatology 152, no. 10 (2016): E1-E8.  
49 An article on Glamour magazine’s website discusses a particularly extreme anti-aging skin treatment that involves 
treating skin with stem cells harvested from the surgical discards of routine infant circumcisions. Beth Shapouri, 
“This New Anti-Aging Skin Treatment Might Give You the Heebie-Jeebies, but the Science Is Fascinating,” 
Glamour, March 10, 2015, https://www.glamour.com/story/this-new-anti-aging-skin-treat. 
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both large and pert are somewhat oxymoronic.”50 Women are supposed to be slim but not too 
muscular. Female bodies ought to be “soft” but not “fat.” Further, breasts and butts are supposed 
to be round and perky, large but not too large. Such expectations of women’s bodies often 
requires adherence to extreme forms of dieting and exercise—beyond what is required or even 
suggested for maintaining a healthy lifestyle. Sometimes, attempts to conform to this norm 
involve trips to a plastic surgeon—again a costly, painful, and dangerous measure.  
 Many women will assert that they conform to these norms not in order to be deemed 
attractive to men but for their own personal comfort and satisfaction. One will often hear such 
women say things like: “I do this for myself” or “I shave because that’s my preference.” 
However, even if these women are not consciously trying to make themselves attractive to men 
by conforming to these norms, they are nonetheless trying to achieve an ideal of female 
attractiveness that advantages men and disadvantages women. In other words, such women have 
simply internalized what society has set up as the ideal of female attractiveness, such that they 
judge their own attractiveness according to an ideal of attractiveness that is based on male 
preferences. Thus, we see that adherence to these sexualized norms of female appearance is 
exemplary of Bartky’s self-objectification. These women have internalized the male gaze such 
that, even if they are not trying to attract men by conforming to certain norms, that is the 
standard by which they judge themselves.  
 Further, these norms are harmful. The harms are threefold. First, any efforts made to 
conform to the norms will inevitably limit the freedom of the woman in question. Specifically, 
trying to conform to sexualized gender norms is costly in terms of time, effort, money, and 
                                                 
50 Clare Chambers, Sex Culture and Justice: The Limits of Choice, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP 
(2008): 29-30. 
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pain.51 Second, the ideals that many women aspire to achieve are typically unrealistic and 
unachievable: “Real women are not beautiful when compared with the standards expected of 
them.”52 Thus, a woman may feel a sense of inferiority due to her inability to perfectly conform 
to the ideal image of feminine beauty. Finally, as Chambers notes, norms of feminine appearance 
are harmful because of the role they play in marking women as inferior members of society: “the 
problem with disciplinary appearance norms is not just that they are different for men and 
women, and not just that they are more exacting and expensive (in both time and money) for 
women, but that their effect is to cast women as inferior.”53 
 Given these details about the ways that self-objectification is built into norms of 
femininity, we can understand how women come to sexually objectify themselves in attempting 
to achieve norms of feminine beauty. What is important for my purposes, however, is that trans 
woman (both passing and non-passing) can (and often do) take these norms to apply to 
themselves. Consequently, if a trans woman takes these norms of femininity to apply to herself 
she may come to sexually objectify herself in a way that is characteristic of women’s oppression.  
5 Conclusion 
 I have argued that developing a trans-inclusive definition of gender is essential to 
feminist aims—namely, understanding and combating women’s oppression. First, I argued that 
the political aim of feminism—combatting women’s oppression—implicitly commits feminists 
to bring about a more just society. Given that failing to respect trans identities is itself an 
injustice and leads to further injustices against trans people, it is contrary to this broader 
commitment of feminism for a feminist analysis of gender to marginalize trans women. 
                                                 
51 The issue here is not simply that conforming to these norms limits women’s freedom. Rather, the issue is that, in 
conforming to these norms, women’s freedom is limited in an attempt to achieve an ideal that marks them as 
subordinate and sexualized members of society. 
52 Chambers, Sex, Culture, and Justice, 30. 
53 Ibid., 29. 
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Additionally, given that sexist oppression and transphobic violence share some underlying 
causes, a definition of “woman” that excludes some trans women may indirectly perpetuate the 
oppression of women. Second, I argued that a trans-inclusive definition of “woman” is essential 
to the success of feminist discourse. I proved that all trans women (both passing and non-
passing) can be oppressed as women through cultural stereotypes and internalized oppression 
such that excluding them from feminist analysis would only hinder our understanding of 
women’s oppression.   
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